security: harden against SAST findings (criticals through mediums)

Critical:
- Validate baseURL/sourceURL/upstreamURL at config load time
  (prevents XML injection, XSS, SSRF via config/env manipulation)
- Use xml.Escape for OpenSearch XML template interpolation

High:
- Add security headers middleware (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS, etc.)
- Sanitize result URLs to reject javascript:/data: schemes
- Sanitize infobox img_src against dangerous URL schemes
- Default CORS to deny-all (was wildcard *)

Medium:
- Rate limiter: X-Forwarded-For only trusted from configured proxies
- Validate engine names against known registry allowlist
- Add 1024-char max query length
- Sanitize upstream error messages (strip raw response bodies)
- Upstream client validates URL scheme (http/https only)

Test updates:
- Update extractIP tests for new trusted proxy behavior
This commit is contained in:
Franz Kafka 2026-03-22 16:22:27 +00:00
parent 4b0cde91ed
commit da367a1bfd
23 changed files with 399 additions and 41 deletions

View file

@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func (e *GitHubEngine) Search(ctx context.Context, req contracts.SearchRequest)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4096))
return contracts.SearchResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("github api error: status=%d body=%q", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
return contracts.SearchResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("github api error: status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
var data struct {