samsa/internal/middleware
Franz Kafka da367a1bfd security: harden against SAST findings (criticals through mediums)
Critical:
- Validate baseURL/sourceURL/upstreamURL at config load time
  (prevents XML injection, XSS, SSRF via config/env manipulation)
- Use xml.Escape for OpenSearch XML template interpolation

High:
- Add security headers middleware (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS, etc.)
- Sanitize result URLs to reject javascript:/data: schemes
- Sanitize infobox img_src against dangerous URL schemes
- Default CORS to deny-all (was wildcard *)

Medium:
- Rate limiter: X-Forwarded-For only trusted from configured proxies
- Validate engine names against known registry allowlist
- Add 1024-char max query length
- Sanitize upstream error messages (strip raw response bodies)
- Upstream client validates URL scheme (http/https only)

Test updates:
- Update extractIP tests for new trusted proxy behavior
2026-03-22 16:22:27 +00:00
..
cors.go security: harden against SAST findings (criticals through mediums) 2026-03-22 16:22:27 +00:00
cors_test.go feat: add CORS and rate limiting middleware 2026-03-21 15:54:52 +00:00
ratelimit.go security: harden against SAST findings (criticals through mediums) 2026-03-22 16:22:27 +00:00
ratelimit_burst_test.go feat: add global and burst rate limiters 2026-03-21 18:35:31 +00:00
ratelimit_global.go security: harden against SAST findings (criticals through mediums) 2026-03-22 16:22:27 +00:00
ratelimit_global_test.go feat: add global and burst rate limiters 2026-03-21 18:35:31 +00:00
ratelimit_test.go security: harden against SAST findings (criticals through mediums) 2026-03-22 16:22:27 +00:00
security.go security: harden against SAST findings (criticals through mediums) 2026-03-22 16:22:27 +00:00